The Week Ahead – Jackson Hole, Johannesburg, Consumer Sentiment

 Powell’s Talk at the Jacksonhole Symposium Won’t be Until Friday

The light economic calendar is likely to take a backseat to the annual Jackson Hole Symposium this week and the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. In Jackson Hole, the overriding theme is  “Structural Shifts in the Global Economy”. The annual meeting is intended to have an overriding academic tone, but the number of Fed policymakers involved allows the markets to listen for any meaningful interest rate bias. The expected focus is on remarks from those actually conducting monetary policy, US central bankers. Powell is scheduled to give his speech on the “Economic Outlook” at 10:05 ET on Friday. Meanwhile, 9,900 miles away, the BRICS group of major emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – will hold its heads of state and government summit in Johannesburg from Aug. 22-24. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are expected to attend in person. Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend in person, as there is an arrest warrant out related to the war in Ukraine. He is expected to attend virtually. The markets will be interested to see if the group expands by allowing other countries,also any news related to the New Development Bank (NDB) sometimes called the BRICS bank, and all around economic cooperation.

Stocks may also take their cue from interest rates and the longer end of the yield curve, which has begun adjusting with rising rates for longer-dated maturities.

Monday 8/21

•             There is no key data being released and no expected talks or events with market implications.

Tuesday 8/22

•             7:30 AM ET, Richmond Fed President Thomas Barkin is scheduled to speak. Recent comments from Barkin have been hopeful. Barkin recently said the greater-than-expected easing in inflation in June may be an indication that the US economy can have a “soft landing,” returning to price stability without a damaging recession.

•             10:00 AM ET, the Existing Home Sales annual rate for July is to be at the same level as it was in June, 4.16 million. The National Association of Realtors has been citing a lack of available inventory for the slow pace of sales as existing homeowners are choosing to keep their lower mortgage rates.

•             2:30 PM ET, Chicago Fed President Austan Goolsbee is scheduled to speak. Goolsbee has made it clear he is on the fence as to whether tightening at the September meeting is warranted.

Wednesday 8/23

•             9:45 AM ET, Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) composite for services is expected to show that the number holds above 50 in July, as it has for the last six PMI releases. As for manufacturing,  the consensus is 48.8, which would be down a bit from the  49 reported in June.

•             10:00 AM ET,  New Home Sales in July, a month before mortgage rates began their recent spike, is expected to move higher to a 702,000 annual rate after slowing to 697,000 in June which, though lower than expected, was still the second highest rate in more than a year.

•             10:30 PM ET, EIA The Energy Information Administration (EIA) provides the Petroleum Status Report weekly with information on petroleum inventories in the US, whether produced in the US or abroad. The level of inventories helps determine prices for petroleum products.

•             8:30 PM ET, BRICS Summit.

•            11:00 PM ET, Jackson Hole Symposium.

Thursday 8/24

•             8:30 AM ET, Durable Goods Orders are forecast to fall 4% for August after a 4.6% increase in July, pushed higher by aircraft orders. Ex-transportation orders are forecast to be up 0.2%, with core capital goods orders unchanged.

•             4:30 AM ET, The Fed’s Balance Sheet is expected to have decreased by $31.208 billion to $8.146 trillion for the seven day period ending August 23. This would be a $61.5 billion decline. Market participants and Fed watchers look to this weekly set of numbers to determine, among other things if the Fed is on track with its stated quantitative tightening (QT) plan.

Friday 8/25

•             10:00 AM ET, Consumer Sentiment is expected to end August at 71.2, unchanged from August’s mid-month flash with year-ahead inflation expectations also expected to be unchanged at 3.3%.

•             10:05 AM ET, US Federal Reserve Chairman is expected to give his address at Jackson Hole.

What Else

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Paul Hoffman

Managing Editor, Channelchek

Sources

https://tradingeconomics.com/calendar

https://us.econoday.com/byweek.asp?cust=us

As BRICS Cooperation Accelerates, Is It Time for the US to Develop a BRICS Policy?

Image: External Affairs Ministers at BRICS foreign ministers meeting, MEA Photogallery (Flickr)

An Expansion of BRICS Countries Would Increase its Negotiating Strength

When leaders of the BRICS group of large emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – meet in Johannesburg for two days beginning on Aug. 22, 2023, foreign policymakers in Washington will no doubt be listening carefully.

The BRICS group has been challenging some key tenets of U.S. global leadership in recent years. On the diplomatic front, it has undermined the White House’s strategy on Ukraine by countering the Western use of sanctions on Russia. Economically, it has sought to chip away at U.S. dominance by weakening the dollar’s role as the world’s default currency.

And now the group is looking at expanding, with 23 formal candidates. Such a move – especially if BRICS accepts Iran, Cuba or Venezuela – would likely strengthen the group’s anti-U.S. positioning.

This article was republished with permission from The Conversation, a news site dedicated to sharing ideas from academic experts. It represents the research-based findings and thoughts of, Mihaela Papa, Senior Fellow, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Frank O’Donnell, Adjunct Lecturer in the International Studies Program, Boston College, Zhen Han, Assistant Professor of Global Studies, Sacred Heart University.

So what can Washington expect next, and how can it respond?

Our research team at Tufts University has been working on a multiyear Rising Power Alliances project that has analyzed the evolution of BRICS and the group’s relationship with the U.S. What we have found is that the common portrayal of BRICS as a China-dominated group primarily pursuing anti-U.S. agendas is misplaced.

Rather, the BRICS countries connect around common development interests and a quest for a multipolar world order in which no single power dominates. Yet BRICS consolidation has turned the group into a potent negotiation force that now challenges Washington’s geopolitical and economic goals. Ignoring BRICS as a major policy force – something the U.S. has been prone to do in the past – is no longer an option.

Reining in the America bashing

At the dawn of BRIC cooperation in 2008 – before South Africa joined in 2010, adding an “S” – members were mindful that the group’s existence could lead to tensions with policymakers who viewed the U.S. as the world’s “indispensable nation.”

As Brazil’s former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim observed at the time, “We should promote a more democratic world order by ensuring the fullest participation of developing countries in decision-making bodies.” He saw BRIC countries “as a bridge between industrialized and developing countries for sustainable development and a more balanced international economic policy.”

While such realignments would certainly dilute U.S. power, BRIC explicitly refrained from anti-U.S. rhetoric.

After the 2009 BRIC summit, the Chinese foreign ministry clarified that BRIC cooperation should not be “directed against a third party.” Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon had already confirmed that there would be no America bashing at BRIC and directly rejected China’s and Russia’s efforts to weaken the dollar’s dominance.

Rather, the new entity complemented existing efforts toward multipolarity – including China-Russia cooperation and the India, Brazil, South Africa trilateral dialogue. Not only was BRIC envisioned as a forum for ideas rather than ideologies, but it also planned to stay open and transparent.

BRICS alignment and tensions with the US

Today, BRICS is a formidable group – it accounts for 41% of the world’s population, 31.5% of global gross domestic product and 16% of global trade. As such, it has a lot of bargaining power if the countries act together – which they increasingly do. During the Ukraine war, Moscow’s BRICS partners have ensured Russia’s economic and diplomatic survival in the face of Western attempts to isolate Moscow. Brazil, India, China and South Africa engaged with Russia in 166 BRICS events in 2022. And some members became crucial export markets for Russia.

The group’s political development – through which it has continually added new areas of cooperation and extra “bodies” – is impressive, considering the vast differences among its members.

We designed a BRICS convergence index to measure how BRICS states converged around 47 specific policies between 2009 and 2021, ranging from economics and security to sustainable development. We found deepening convergence and cooperation across these issues and particularly around industrial development and finance.

But BRICS convergence does not necessarily lead to greater tension with the United States. Our data finds limited divergence between the joint policies of BRICS and that of the U.S. on a wide range of issues. Our research also counters the argument that BRICS is China-driven. Indeed, China has been unable to advance some key policy proposals. For example, since the 2011 BRICS summit, China has sought to establish a BRICS free trade agreement but could not get support from other states. And despite various trade coordination mechanisms in BRICS, the overall trade among BRICS remains low – only 6% of the countries’ combined trade.

However, tensions between the United States and BRICS exist, especially when BRICS turns “bloc-like” and when U.S. global interests are at stake. The turning point for this was 2015, when BRICS achieved major institutional growth under Russia’s presidency. This coincided with Moscow enhancing its pivot to China and BRICS following Western sanctions over Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia was eager to develop alternatives to Western-led institutional and market mechanisms it could no longer benefit from.

That said, important champions of BRICS convergence are also close strategic partners to the U.S. For example, India has played a major role in strengthening the security dimension of BRICS cooperation, championing a counter-terrorism agenda that has drawn U.S. opposition due to its vague definition of terrorist actors.

Further constraints on U.S. power may emerge from BRICS transitioning to using local currencies over the dollar and encouraging BRICS candidate countries to do the same. Meanwhile, China and Russia’s efforts to engage BRICS on outer space governance is another trend for policymakers in Washington to watch.

Toward a US BRICS Policy?

So where does a more robust – and potentially larger – BRICS leave the U.S.?

To date, U.S. policy has largely ignored BRICS as an entity. The U.S. foreign and defense policymaking apparatus is regionally oriented. In the past 20 years, it has pivoted from the Middle East to Asia and most recently to the Indo-Pacific region.

When it comes to the BRICS nations, Washington has focused on developing bilateral relations with Brazil, India and South Africa, while managing tensions with China and isolating Russia. The challenge for the Biden administration is understanding how, as a group, BRICS’ operations and institutions affect U.S. global interests.

Meanwhile, BRICS expansion raises new questions. When asked about U.S. partners such as Algeria and Egypt wanting to join BRICS, the Biden administration explained that it does not ask partners to choose between the United States and other countries.

But the international demand for joining BRICS calls for a deeper reflection on how Washington pursues foreign policy.

Designing a BRICS-focused foreign policy is an opportunity for the United States to innovate around addressing development needs. Rather than dividing countries into friendly democracies and others, a BRICS-focused policy can see the Biden administration lead on universal development issues and build development-focused, close relationships that encourage a better alignment between countries of the Global South and the United States.

It could also allow the Biden administration to deepen cooperation with India, Brazil, South Africa and some of the new BRICS candidates. Areas of focus could include issues where the BRICS countries have struggled to coordinate their policy, such as AI development and governance, energy security and global restrictions on chemical and biological weapons.

Developing a BRICS policy could help re-imagine U.S. foreign policy and ensure that the United States is well positioned in a multipolar world.

Gold Could Get Much Stronger from BRICS Plans

The BRICS Currency Project Picks Up Speed

On Friday, July 7, 2023, news broke in the financial market media that the “BRICS” (that is, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) will implement their plan to create a new international currency for trading and financial transactions, and that this new currency will be “gold-backed”. Most recently, on June 2, 2023, the foreign ministers of the BRICS – as well as representatives from more than 12 countries – met in Cape Town, South Africa (interestingly at the “Cape of Good Hope”). Among other things, it was emphasized that they wanted to create an international trading currency. Undoubtedly, this is an undertaking that could have consequences of epic proportions.

After all, the BRICS countries represent about 3.2 billion people, approximately 40 percent of the world’s population, with a combined economic output nearly the size of the economy of the United States of America. And there are also many other countries (such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran, Algeria, Argentina, and Kazakhstan) that might want to join the BRICS club.

The goal of the BRICS countries is to reduce their economic and political dependence on the US dollar, challenging “US dollar imperialism”. To this end, they want to create a new international currency for commercial and financial transactions, replacing the US dollar as the means of transaction unit.

The reason is obvious. The US administration has on many occasions used the greenback as a “geopolitical weapon” and engaged in a kind of “financial warfare”: Washington sanctions enemy countries by denying them access to the US dollar capital market, but above all, it shuts them off from the international US dollar-centric payment system.

The freezing of Russia’s currency reserves (the equivalent of almost 600 billion US dollars is currently at stake) has set off alarm bells in many non-Western countries. It has reminded a number of them that holding US dollars comes with a political risk. This, in turn, has prompted many to restructure their international foreign reserves: holding fewer US dollars, switching to other (smaller) currencies, but above all, buying more gold.

But how might the BRCIS manage to swim away from the US dollar? While no details are available yet about how the new BRICS currency might be structured, it should not stop us from speculating about what lies ahead.

The BRICS could establish a new bank (the “BRICS-Bank”), funded by gold deposits from BRICS central banks. The physically deposited gold holdings would be shown on the asset side of the BRICS bank’s balance sheet – and could be denominated, for example, “BRICS-Gold”, where 1 BRICS-Gold represents 1 gram of physical gold.

The BRICS-Bank can then grant loans denominated in BRICS-Gold (for example, to exporters from BRICS countries and/or to importers of goods from abroad). To fund the loans, the BRICS-Bank makes a credit contract with the holders of BRICS-Gold: The holders of BRICS-Gold agree to transfer their deposit to the BRICS-Bank for, say, one month, or one or two years, against receiving an interest rate. What is more, the BRICS-Bank, and it can also accept further gold deposits from international investors, who can hold (interest-bearing) BRICS-Gold deposits this way.

BRICS-Gold could henceforth be used by the BRICS countries and their trading partners as international money, as an international unit of account in global trade and financial transactions. Incidentally, the new de facto gold currency would not even have to be physically minted but could be and remain an accounting-only unit while being redeemable on demand.

The exporters from the BRICS countries and the other member countries would, however, have to be willing to sell their goods against BRICS-Gold instead of US dollars and other Western fiat currencies, and the importers from the Western countries would have to be willing and able to pay their bills in BRICS gold.

How do you get BRICS-Gold? Those demanding BRICS-Gold must either get a BRICS-Gold loan from the BRICS-Bank or purchase gold in the market and deposit it with the BRICS-Bank or a designated custodian, and the gold deposit is then credited to his account in the form of BRICS-Gold.

For example, in payment transactions, the goods importer’s BRICS-Gold deposits (held, for example, at the BRICS-Bank) are credited to the account of the exporter of goods (also held at the BRICS-Bank or at a correspondent bank or gold custodian).

However, the transition, the use of BRICS-Gold as an international trade and transaction currency, would most likely have far-reaching consequences:

(1.) It would presumably lead to a (sharp) increase in the demand for gold compared to current levels, with not only gold prices measured in US dollars, euros, etc. but also in the currencies of the BRICS countries increasing (substantially).

(2.) Such an increase in the gold price would devalue the purchasing power of the official currencies – not only the US dollar but also the BRICS currencies – against the yellow metal. Also, the prices of goods in terms of the official fiat currencies would most likely skyrocket, debasing the purchasing power of presumably all existing fiat currencies.

(3.) The BRICS countries would build up gold reserves to the extent that they run, or will run, trade surpluses. They would presumably be the winners of the “currency switch”, while the countries with trade deficits (first and foremost, the US) would lose out.

BRICS official gold holdings, in billion US dollars, Q1 2023

 Source: Refinitiv; The BRICS’ gold reserves amounted to 5452.7 tons in the first quarter of 2023 (market value currently around 350 billion US Dollars).

These few considerations already show how disrupting the topic of “creating a new gold-backed international trading currency” could be: The BRICS could well trigger landslide-like changes in the global economic and financial structure. Still, it will be interesting to see how the BRICS countries intend to proceed at their August 22-24 meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa.

About the Author:

Dr. Thorsten Polleit is Chief Economist of Degussa and Honorary Professor at the University of Bayreuth. He also acts as an investment advisor.