Tag: Dollar

Why US ‘Dollar Doomsayers’ Could be Wrong About its Imminent Demise

Posted on by phoffman@channelchek.com

Dollar Global Usefulness Can Not Easily be Replaced

The prospect of the dollar being knocked from its perch as the primary fiat currency is worrisome to many Americans. Anxiety has been recently increased by news of short-term arrangements in which countries want to exchange more directly with one another in their native currency. China has established quite a few of these agreements over the past year. But is the widespread global use of the dollar in jeopardy?  

Daniel Gros is a Professor of Practice and Director of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University. In the article below, originally published in The Conversation, Professor Gros offers his insight and expectations for the US currency.  

Is the end of the dollar’s reign upon us? The prospect is worrisome to Americans.

The position of the US dollar in the global league table of foreign exchange reserves held by other countries is closely watched. Every slight fall in its share is interpreted as confirmation of its imminent demise as the preferred global currency for financial transactions.

The recent drama surrounding negotiations about raising the limit on US federal government debt has only fuelled these predictions by “dollar doomsayers”, who believe repeated crises over the US government’s borrowing limit weakens the country’s perceived stability internationally.

But the real foundation of its dominance is global trade – and it would be very complicated to turn the tide of these many transactions away from the US dollar.

The international role of a global currency in financial markets is ultimately based on its use in non-financial transactions, especially as what’s called an “invoicing currency” in trade. This is the currency in which a company charges its customers.

Modern trade can involve many financial transactions. Today’s supply chains often see goods shipped across several borders, and that’s after they are produced using a combination of intermediate inputs, usually from different countries.

Suppliers may also only get paid after delivery, meaning they have to finance production beforehand. Obtaining this financing in the currency in which they invoice makes trade easier and more cost effective.

In fact, it would be very inconvenient for all participants in a value chain if the invoicing and financing of each element of the chain happened in a different currency. Similarly, if most trade is invoiced and financed in one currency (the US dollar at present), even banks and firms outside the US have an incentive to denominate and settle financial transactions in that currency.

This status quo becomes difficult to change because no individual organisation along the chain has an incentive to switch currencies if others aren’t doing the same.

This is why the US dollar is the most widely used currency in third-country transactions – those that don’t even involve the US. In such situations it’s called a vehicle currency. The euro is used mainly in the vicinity of Europe, whereas the US dollar is widely used in international trade among Asian countries. Researchers call this the dominant currency paradigm.

The convenience of using the US dollar, even outside its home country, is further buttressed by the openness and size of US financial markets. They make up 36% of the world’s total or five times more than the euro area’s markets. Most trade-related financial transactions involve the use of short-term credit, like using a credit card to buy something. As a result, the banking systems of many countries must then be at least partially based on the dollar so they can provide this short-term credit.

And so, these banks need to invest in the US financial markets to refinance themselves in dollars. They can then provide this to their clients as dollar-based short-term loans.

It’s fair to say, then, that the US dollar has not become the premier global currency only because of US efforts to foster its use internationally. It will also continue to dominate as long as private organisations engaged in international trade and finance find it the most convenient currency to use.

What Could Knock the US Dollar Off its Perch?

Some governments such as that of China might try to offer alternatives to the US dollar, but they are unlikely to succeed.

Government-to-government transactions, for example for crude oil between China and Saudi Arabia, could be denominated in yuan. But then the Saudi government would have to find something to do with the Chinese currency it receives. Some could be used to pay for imports from China, but Saudi Arabia imports a lot less from China (about US$30 billion) than it exports (about US$49 billion) to the country.

The US$600 billion Public Investment Fund (PIF), Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, could of course use the yuan to invest in China. But this is difficult on a large scale because Chinese currency remains only partially “convertible”. This means that the Chinese authorities still control many transactions in and out of China, so that the PIF might not be able to use its yuan funds as and when it needs them. Even without convertibility restrictions, few private investors, and even fewer western investment funds, would be keen to put a lot of money into China if they are at the mercy of the Communist party.

China is of course the country with the strongest political motives to challenge the hegemony of the US dollar. A natural first step would be for China to diversify its foreign exchange reserves away from the US by investing in other countries. But this is easier said than done.

There are few opportunities to invest hundreds or thousands of billions of dollars outside of the US. Figures from the Bank of International Settlements show that the euro area bond market – a place for investors to finance loans to Euro area companies and governments – is worth less than one third of that of the US.

Also, in any big crisis, other major OECD economies like Europe and Japan are more likely to side with the US than China – making such a decision is even easier when they are using US dollars for trade. It was said that states accounting for one-half of the global population refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but this half does not account for a large share of global financial markets.

Similarly, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that democracies dominate the world financially. Companies and financial markets require trust and a well-established rule of law. Non-democratic regimes have no basis for establishing the rule of law and every investor is ultimately subject to the whims of the ruler.

When it comes to global trade, currency use is underpinned by a self-reinforcing network of transactions. Because of this, and the size of the US financial market, the dollar’s dominant position remains something for the US to lose rather for others to gain.

Gold in the Face of a Multipolar World Order

Posted on by phoffman@channelchek.com

Petrodollar Dusk, Petroyuan Dawn: What Investors Need To Know

While most investors were trying to gauge the Federal Reserve’s next moves in light of recent bank failures last week, something interesting happened in Moscow.

During a three-day state visit, Chinese President Xi Jinping held friendly talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a show of unity, as both countries increasingly seek to position themselves as leaders of what they call a “multipolar world order,” one that challenges U.S.-centric alliances and agreements.

Among those agreements is the petrodollar, which has been in place for over 50 years. 

In case you’re wondering, “petrodollars” are not a real currency. They’re simply dollars being used to trade oil. Early in the 1970s, the U.S. government provided economic aid to Saudi Arabia, its chief oil-producing rival, in exchange for assurances that Riyadh would price its crude exports exclusively in the U.S. dollar. In 1975, other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) followed suit, and the petrodollar was born.

This had the immediate effect of strengthening the U.S. dollar. Since countries around the world had to have dollars on hand in order to buy oil (and other key commodities such as gold, also priced in dollars), the greenback became the world’s reserve currency, a status formerly enjoyed by the British pound, French franc and Dutch guilder.

All things must come to an end, however. We may be witnessing the end of the petrodollar as more and more countries, including China and Russia, are agreeing to make settlements in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. This could have wide-ranging implications on not just a macro scale but also investment portfolios.

This article was republished with permission from Frank Talk, a CEO Blog by Frank Holmes of U.S. Global Investors (GROW). Find more of Frank’s articles here – Originally published March 27, 2023

Dawn For The Petroyuan?

Putin couldn’t have been more explicit. During Xi’s state visit, he named the Chinese yuan as his favored currency to conduct trade in. Ever since Western sanctions were levied on the Eastern European country for its invasion of Ukraine early last year, Russia has increasingly depended on its southern neighbor to buy the oil other countries won’t touch. 

In just the first two months of 2023, China’s imports from Russia totaled $9.3 billion, exceeding full-year 2022 imports in dollar terms. In February alone, China imported over 2 million barrels of Russian crude, a new record high.

Except that now, the yuan is presumably being used to make these settlements.

As Zoltar Pozsar, New York-based economist and investment research director at Credit Suisse, put it recently: “That’s dusk for the petrodollar… and dawn for the petroyuan.”

U.S. Dollar Still The World’s Reserve Currency, But Its Dominance Is Slipping

Before you dismiss Pozsar’s comment as an exaggeration, consider that other major OPEC nations and BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are either accepting yuan already or strongly considering it. Russia, Iran and Venezuela account for about 40% of the world’s proven oilfields, and the three sell their oil in exchange for yuan. Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia and heavyweight oil producer Saudi Arabia have all applied for admittance into BRICS, while Egypt became a new member this week.

What this suggests is that the yuan’s role as a reserve currency will continue to strengthen, signifying a broader shift in the global power balance and potentially giving China a bigger hand with which to shape economic policies that affect us all.

To be clear, the U.S. dollar remains the world’s top reserve currency for now, though its share of global central banks’ official holdings has slipped in the past 20 years, from 72% in 2001 to just under 60% today. By contrast, the yuan’s share of official holdings has more than doubled since 2016. The Chinese currency accounted for about 2.8% of reserves as of September 2022. 

Russia Diversifying Away From The Dollar By Loading Up On Gold

It’s not all about the yuan, of course. Gold has also increased as a foreign reserve, especially among emerging economies that seek to diversify away from the dollar.

Last week, Russia announced that its bullion holdings jumped by approximately 1 million ounces over the past 12 months as its central bank loaded up on gold in the face of Western sanctions. The bank reported having nearly 75 million ounces at the end of February 2023, up from about 74 million a year earlier.

Long-Term Implications For Investors

The implications of the dollar potentially losing its status as the global reserve are numerous. Obviously, there may be currency risks, and a decrease in demand for U.S. Treasury bonds could result in rising interest rates. I would expect to see massive swings in commodity prices, especially oil prices, which could be an opportunity if you can stomach the volatility.

Gold would look exceptionally attractive, I think. A significant decrease in the relative value of the dollar would be supportive of the gold price, and I would be surprised not to see new highs. It’s for reasons like these that I always recommend a 10% weighting in gold, with 5% in physical bullion and the other 5% in high-quality gold mining equities. Be sure to rebalance at least on an annual basis.

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The New Effort to Re-Anchor the US Dollar to US Gold Stock

Posted on by phoffman@channelchek.com
US Sailors, Coastal Riverine Group, Restoring Command Anchor with Gold Paint, Credit: US Pacific Fleet (Flickr)

Can the Dollar Once Again Be Anchored by Gold? One Congressman Believes It Can

On October 7, 2022, US congressman Alex Mooney (a Republican from West Virginia) introduced a bill (the Gold Standard Restoration Act, H.R. 9157) that stipulates that the US dollar must be backed by physical gold owned by the US Treasury. The initiative clearly indicates that the increasingly inflationary US dollar is triggering efforts to get better money.

It should be noted that there have already been many legislative changes to make precious metals more attractive as a means of payment in recent years: in many US states, the value-added and capital gains taxes on gold and silver, but also on platinum and palladium, have been abolished. Mr. Mooney’s proposal is divided into three sections.

The first section of the bill establishes the need for a return to a gold-backed US dollar. For example, it is said that the US dollar—or more precisely, the bill refers to “Federal Reserve Notes”—that is, banknotes issued by the US Federal Reserve (Fed)—has lost its purchasing power on a massive scale in the past: Since 2000, it has dropped by 30 percent, and since 1913 by 97 percent. The bill also argues that with an inflation target of 2 percent, the Fed will not preserve the purchasing power of the US dollar but will have it halved after just thirty-five years. Moreover, the bill points out that it is in the interest of US citizens and firms to have a “stable US dollar.” The bill highlights that the inflationary US dollar has been eroding the industrial base of the US economy, enriching the owners of financial assets, while endangering workers’ jobs, wages, and savings.

The second section of the bill describes in more detail the technical process for re-anchoring the US dollar to the US official gold stock. It states that (1) the US secretary of the Treasury must define the US dollar banknotes using a fixed fine gold weight thirty days after the law goes into effect, based on the closing price of the gold on that day. The Fed must (2) ensure that the US banknotes are redeemable for physical gold at the designated rate at the Fed. (3) If the banks of the Fed system fail to comply with peoples’ exchange requests, the exchange must be made by the US Treasury, and in return, the Treasury takes the Fed’s bank assets as collateral.

The third section specifies how a “fair” gold price in US dollar can develop in an orderly manner within thirty days after the bill has taken effect. To this end, (1) the US Treasury and the Fed must publish all of their gold holdings, disclosing all purchases, sales, swaps, leases, and all other gold transactions that have taken place since the “temporary” suspension of the redeemability of the US dollar into gold on August 15, 1971, under the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. In addition, (2) the US Treasury and the Fed must publicly disclose all gold redemptions and transfers in the 10 years preceding the “temporary” suspension of the US dollar’s gold redemption obligation on August 15, 1971.

What to Make of This?

The bill’s core is the idea of re-anchoring the US dollar to physical gold based on a fair gold price freely determined in the market. (By the way, this is an idea put forward by the economist Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) in the early 1950s.) In this context, the bill refers to US banknotes. However, banknotes only comprise a (fractional) part of the total US dollar money supply. But since US bank deposits can be redeemed (at least in principle) in US banknotes, not only US dollar cash (coins and notes) could be exchanged for gold, but also the money supply M1 or M2 as fixed and savings deposits could be exchanged for sight deposits, and sight deposits, in turn, could be withdrawn in cash by customers, and the banknotes could then be exchanged for gold at the Fed.

As of August 2022, the stock of US cash (“currency in circulation”) amounted to $2,276.3 billion. Assuming that the official physical gold holdings of the US Treasury amount to 261.5 million troy ounces, and the market expected US cash to be backed by the official US gold stock, a gold price of about $8,700 per troy ounce would result. This would correspond to a 418 percent increase compared to the current gold price of $1,680. If, however, the market were to expect the entire US money supply M2 to be covered by the official US gold stock, then the price of gold would move toward $83,000 per troy ounce—an increase of 4.840 percent compared to the current gold price. Needless to say, such an appreciation of gold has far-reaching consequences.

All goods prices in US dollars can be expected to rise (perhaps to the extent that the price of gold has risen). After all, the purchasing power of the owners of gold has increased significantly. Therefore, they can be expected to use their increased purchasing power to buy other goods (such as consumer goods, but also stocks, houses, etc.). If this happens, the prices of these goods in US dollar terms will be pushed up—and thus, the initial purchasing power gain that the gold dollar holders have enjoyed by being tied to the increased gold price will melt away again. Moreover, if US banks were willing to accept additional gold from the public in exchange for issuing new US dollar, reanchoring the US dollar in gold would increase the upward price effect.

A re-anchoring of the US dollar in the US official gold stock will result in a far-reaching redistribution of income and wealth. In fact, it would be fatal for the outstanding US dollar debt: US dollar goods prices would rise, caused by a rise in the US dollar gold price at which the US dollar is redeemable for physical gold, thereby eroding the US dollar’s purchasing power. In the foreign exchange markets, the US dollar would probably appreciate drastically against those currencies that are not backed by gold and against currencies which are backed by gold, not as fine compared to the fineness of the gold backing of the US dollar. The purchasing power of the US dollar abroad would increase sharply, while the US export economy would suffer. US goods would become correspondingly expensive abroad, while foreign companies gain high price competitiveness in the US market.

Once the US dollar is re-anchored in gold, today’s chronic inflation will end; monetary policy–induced boom-and-bust cycles will come to an end; the world will become more peaceful because financing a war in a gold-backed monetary system will be very expensive, and the general public will most likely not want to bear its costs. However, there is still room for improvement. A “Gold Standard Restoration Act” will deserve unconditional support if and when it paves the way toward a truly “free market for money.” A free market in money means that you and I have the freedom to choose the kind of money we believe serves our purposes best; and that people are free to offer their fellow human beings a good that they voluntarily choose to use as money.

In a truly free market, people will choose the good they want to use as money. Most importantly, in a truly free market in money, the state (as we know it today) loses its influence on money and money production altogether. In fact, the state (and the special interest groups that exploit the state) no longer determine which kind of gold (coins and bars, cast or minted) can be used as money; the state is no longer active in the minting business and cannot monopolize it anymore; there is no longer a state-controlled central bank to intervene in the credit and money markets and influence market interest rates. That said, let us hope that the Gold Standard Restoration Act proposed by Mr. Mooney will pave the way to reforming the US dollar currency system—and that it will eventually move us toward a truly free market in money.

About the Author

Dr. Thorsten Polleit is the Chief Economist of Degussa and an Honorary Professor at the University of Bayreuth. He also acts as an investment advisor.

Will the Dollar and Securities Markets Sink When the War Ends?

Posted on by cpatches
Image Credit: Andre Furtado

The Story of War and Peace in the Currency Markets

There is a story of war and peace in the contemporary currency markets. It has a main plot and many subplots. As yet, the story is without end. That may come sooner than many now expect.

The narrator today has a more challenging job than the teller of the story about neutral, Entente, and Central Power currencies during World War I. (See Brown, Brendan “Monetary Chaos in Europe” chapter 2 [Routledge, 2011].)

Today’s Russia war (whether the military conflict in Ukraine or the EU/US-Russia economic war) is not so all-pervasive in global economic and monetary affairs, though it is doubtless prominent. The monetary setting of the story today is much more nuanced than in World War I when the prevailing expectation was that peace would mark the start of a journey where key currencies eventually returned to their prewar gold parities.

In the 1914–18 conflict, any sudden news of a possible end to the conflict—as with the peace notes of President Woodrow Wilson in December 1916—would cause a sharp fall of the neutral currencies (Swiss franc, Dutch guilder, Spanish peseta), a big rise in the German mark and Austrian-Hungarian crown, and lesser rises in sterling and the French franc. Today, in principle, a sudden emergence of peace diplomacy would most plausibly send the euro and British pound higher on the one hand and the Canadian dollar, US dollar, and Swiss franc lower on the other hand.

Mutual exhaustion and military stalemate are a combination from which surprise diplomatic moves to end war can emerge. These circumstances apply today.

Ukraine is falling into an economic abyss—much of its infrastructure reportedly destroyed and its government is resorting to the money printing press to pay its soldiers (see Kenneth Rogoff et al., “Macroeconomic Policies for Wartime Ukraine,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, August 12, 2022). General economic aid from Western donors (as against military aid) is running far short of promises. All these pictures of Russian munitions stores on fire may or may not have excited some potential donors, but they have not heralded any breakthrough.

The human toll—both amongst military personnel and civilians—fans Moscow propaganda that the US and UK are willing to conduct their proxy war against Russia down to the life of the last Ukrainian soldier.

Meanwhile there are these presumably leaked stories in the Washington Post about how President Volodymyr Zelensky betrayed the Ukrainian people by not sharing with them in late 2021 and early 2022 the US intelligence alerts about a looming Russian invasion. According to the stories, many Ukrainians resent that they were not warned by their government and do not accept its shocking excuses (for example, to prevent a flight of capital out of the country).

Is all this preparing ground for a possible power shift in Kiev that might favor an early diplomatic solution even in time for President Joe Biden to claim credit ahead of the midterms? Western Europe will be spared some pain this winter if the initial ceasefire agreement includes a provision that Moscow desist from turning off the gas pipelines.

The purpose here is not to predict the war’s outcome but to describe a peace scenario that is within the mainstream and to map out how the rising likelihood of its realization would influence currency markets.

The main channel of influence on currencies would be the course of the EU/US-Russia economic war. A ceasefire would excite expectations of big relief to the natural gas shortage in Western Europe.

Prices there for natural gas would plunge. In turn, that would lift consumer and business spirits, now depressed by feared astronomic gas bills and even gas rationing this winter. Massive programs to relieve fuel poverty, financed by monetary inflation, would stop in their tracks. The European Central Bank (ECB) could move resolutely to tighten monetary conditions as the depression fears faded.

We could well imagine that the peace scenario would mean the European economies in 2023 would rebound from a winter downturn. That would coincide with the US economy sinking into recession as the “Powell disinflation” works its way through—including continued bubble bursting in the tech space and residential construction sector plus a possible private equity bust.

A big rise of the euro under the peace scenario, though likely, is not a slam-dunk proposition. Russia might delay turning the gas pipelines back on until there is an assurance about its central bank’s frozen deposits in Western Europe. There has been chatter from the top of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) down that a reparations commission would sequester these.

More broadly, it could be that most European households are not cutting back their spending to the extent assumed in the consensus economic forecasts. Many individuals may have never believed that the high natural gas prices would persist beyond this winter. Then they faced, in effect, a transitory rather than permanent tax rise. Economic theory suggests that such transitory taxes, paid in this case to North American natural gas producers, have much less impact than permanent ones on spending.

There are still the deep ailments of the euro. How can the ECB ever normalize monetary conditions when so much of the monetary base is backed by loans and credits to weak sovereigns and banks (see Brendan Brown, “ECB’s Long Journey into Currency Collapse Just Got a Lot Shorter,” Mises Wire, July 23, 2022)?

In principle, the US dollar, and even more so the Canadian dollar, would lose from peace as they have gained from war. Both have obtained fuel from the boom in their issuing country’s energy sector. In neither country has there been aggregate real income loss due to the economic war—in fact, there has been a gain in the case of Canada. A further positive for the US dollar has been the boom in the US armaments sector—and this should continue beyond a ceasefire.

Peace will not deflect Europe from seeking to diversify its energy supplies away from Russia and to North American gas and to renewables. But we can imagine that in the long-run, Germany could have a comparative advantage in the renewable space; and North America could lose potential sales outside Europe to Russian gas at discounted prices. Russia is widely expected to prioritize a vamped-up construction program for LNG (liquid natural gas) terminals. These will enable the export of its natural gas to world markets.

Bottom line: peace is likely to be a negative for the US dollar. But transcending this influence is the huge issue of how and when US monetary inflation regains virulence.

About the Author:

Brendan Brown is a founding partner of Macro Hedge Advisors (www.macrohedgeadvisors.com) and senior fellow at Hudson Institute. He is an international monetary and financial economist, consultant, and author, his roles have included Head of Economic Research at Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and is also a Senior Fellow of the Mises Institute. Brendan authored Europe’s Century of Crises under Dollar Hegemony: A Dialogue on the Global Tyranny of Unsound Money with Philippe Simonnot.

The article was republished with permission from The Mises Institute. The original version can be found here.